At 12:34 PM 9/2/01 -0700, Tim May wrote:
Someone else:
The fact that you may be identifiable at the point of entry to an anonymity system is a weakness, not a desired feature, and if it can be avoided, it should be.
Then design such a system.
You did a few lines earlier:
(Or if one is a remailer oneself.)
If the next generation of <OS, browser, Morpheus, etc.> came with a remailer that was on by default, then even running a remailer would be too common to draw attention (prosecute). And given that Joe Sixpack's node regularly relays MSMixmaster messages, the *occasional* message injected by Joe will be nearly invisible. Heavy use might be detectable depending on how obvious the relayed messages are.
"Anyone a remailer, anyone a mint" is one strong approach.
Very strong. In the case of a remailer, necessary. I suppose the spam potential, of everyone an SMTP forwarder, is problem? Surmountable. Deployment, sending-ease-of-use are the real problems.