------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: Adamsc@io-online.com (Adamsc) To: "paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk" <paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk> On Mon, 2 Sep 1996 19:24:23 +0000, paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk wrote:
This system has 1 huge fault, we can encrypt a uses ID with the servers public key to see what his ID in the encrypted database is and therefore identify him, maybe we need two seperate server public keys, and when IDs come in encrypted with key1 (the one it releases) it decrypts with secretkey1 then encrypts with publickey2 (the one it keeps secret)
or maybe we can just hash and sign the IDs in the database?
as I said it`s very sketchy, I made most of this up as I wrote it so if you must tear it to pieces please do so constructively, it could be the route to a secure system....
How about this: do the exchange *every* time. Never reuse a key. That way at most 1 message could be easily snagged (by seeing where it goes). It'd be processor intensive, but it avoids the whole reuse problem - where you store an ID to be used to retrieve all messages. Also, software could be written to do the key computation solely on the client - after all, the server doesn't care if they pass themselves a dud key, right? Let them crunch it. Put all those Pentiums to work! ... Better idea, I hadn`t thought of that, anyone else care to comment on a way to solve this? - how did the nymservers do it???? Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az4= =riHc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----