On 26 Sep 96 at 10:49, Brian Davis wrote:
If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed, I agree. I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more ways than one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against them by governments, given their modus operandi.
I don't think that any of them will complain because they understand the nature of it. I think that Jim Bell (forgive me Jim...:) view that there will be only limited retaliation from government is not guaranteed at all. As I said somewhere previously, the whole thing will depend on how the authorities view AP as (non-) attackable. Here is the post I wrote earlier: ------- earlier post ------- jim bell recently wrote:
Local police action against an AP organization would, of course, be deterred by the prospect of naming anybody who would go after it, and soliciting donations against them.
I don't agree here. It would all be a matter of timing, unless the number of AP servers would be sprouting out faster than police forces would be able to destroy them. You have to realize that if the money is seized, noboby will be willing to make a hit since the odds of being paid are not too good. Just play the game "Command and Conquer" for a while and you'll see. Money is fuel. Don't run off of it! For that reason, I think that any AP server, *at the introduction of the concept* would have to be a covert operation. Servers could come out in public light when their number be large enough to warrant a strike on anybody trying to eliminate them. Same for the publication of the name of the individuals operating the server. To me, this seems obvious. Comments? To go on along that line, I had the idea that a specific piece of software, a bit like Private Idaho, that would chain remailers but that would be specifically designed to handle predictions, would have be designed. (Pardon my ignorance of the net here) The server need not to be a unique address. Actually, the prediction and any accompanying documents could be splitted a la Secure Split, and sent to N differents servers, M (<N) of which would be required to re-assemble the original prediction. This assures that if one gets closed, the other can rebuild the message. If thoses servers were set up on *large* machines servicing tens of thousands of messages a day, preferably located at a busy remailer location, any exchange of information between them to rebuild the prediction at a central location would not be easy to track by any govt. Comments? ----- end of earlier post ----- Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultant physicists and engineers, LabView programming PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891