At 2:10 AM 1/4/1997, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
In list.cypherpunks, ph@netcom.com writes:
In essence, the poster is betting that the moderator will approve the post retroactively.
The "moderator" returns the money to people when posts are worthwhile and keeps it otherwise.
Of course, there's no reason to have just one moderator on the list.
In the case of several moderators, who gets the ecash? And doesn't this open the list to bidding? "Pass this message, and you can keep the e$500."
The moderator keeps the cash. The moderator is pulled in several directions. He or she wants to keep the money but also wants people to post through him or her. The moderator also wants to be credible or their services will not be required. If it is implemented in a decentralized manner, the list is not up for bidding, but the ability to get past killfiles is. That is, anybody can post to the list, but some people will only read things coming from credible sources. The money you pay gets to those people. This is no different from the original scheme with a limited number of tokens. If the anonymity is preserved, you can always pay somebody $500 to go to the trouble of getting one of the rare tokens distributed or to buy one off a list member who already has one. In the modified scheme, the cost is quantified and easy to express and understand. Peter Hendrickson ph@netcom.com