"The pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was programmed to go haywire," writes Reed, "to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space."
Russians did one BIG mistake: they entrusted a critical system into the hands of a single electronical system. Safety systems should be a multi-level combination of approaches; from mechanical safety valves (which may be as simple as a thinner patch of metal with defined pressure resistance mounted over a pipeline tap, so when an overpressure happens the line blows in a known, easy to guard and inspect (and replace) place, instead in a weld or junction somewhere) to a diverse array of monitoring tools sourced by multiple vendors. In case of full dependence on foreign (and hostile) source, the acquired system has to be thoroughly reverse-engineered and audited. In cases where it is impossible/impractical, eg. big computer systems, another system should check a subset of the results of the main computer, and alert about possible discrepancies. As added advantage, this approach catches not only intentional sabotages, but also natural mishaps. This story wasn't a success of US sabotage by far as much as it was a blatant failure of Soviet engineering. God is. His name is Murphy. Engineer defensively.