On May 23, 1996 10:41:13, 'tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)' wrote:
Of course, this appears to be implying that _domestic_ data will be subject to Clipper 3 restrictions, else this statement is meaningless.
So, will my stored-value cards that I "charge up" in California and carry in my wallet to Zurich be GAKked? If not, Morris's statement is meaningless. If so, domestic data is intended to be GAKked.
(But we knew this, didn't we?)
Several news reports in the last few days seem to be aiming at raising the alarm about crypto, perhaps in response to the various crypto bills, administration reformulations, and studies such as that headed by Herb Lin. The recycling of the news of DoD break-ins supposedly due to heavy military reliance on the Internet; the drumbeat of conferences, press releases and planted stories on international money laundering, the hazards of E-money to the stability of the banking system, spreading "Russian" criminality, and the role of high-technology in each; global Chinese arms dealers and copyright pirates; thousands of Japanese spies needed to combat "Asian" threats. These scares might well be orchestrated in support of Clipper 3 -- to the mutual benefit of international governments and commerce as stated by the IWGCP report. The Clipper 3 report, as John Gilmore and others have noted, aims at an international clampdown on non-GAKed crypto. For this to work, all the major crypto players must agree to act at the same time so that no one gets an advantage by offering non-GAKed products. But is it not probable that there will be a holdout nation(s), like the Swiss in war and bank secrecy, to offer crypto that is non-GAKed? Or will a holdout be starved? Or is it more likely that the genuine alternative to multilateral governmental regulation is going to be small- scale, non-corporate, private parties, insusceptible to large-sacle governmental-market coercion, willing to offer risky, covert services, perhaps as lucrative as prohibited armaments? In such a case, for example, would not a highly skilled cryptographer, let us call her Mathilda Blaze, be able to sell covert crypto (on the side, encrypted transactions, anonymity assured) for far greater reward than a not-very- secure pittance and pension at a downsizing ATT, or NSA, or Russia, China, Israel, France, UK, NL, JP ... ? To be sure, if we knew what they knew, we would understand why the House has just increased the intelligence budget to $30bn, $2bn more than 1996 (WaPo 5-23-96). Maybe all the major crypto nations (gov-and-com), are minting E-money to pay their best techies to protect their secrets. If so, may the best algorithmist take 'em all to the cleaners -- just remember to share with the hackers spooking the spooks-and-crooks of gov-com intel-insec, and causing "Yo, man's" of recognition and admiration of those peering for pennies at ELINT and NetSec screens.