Bruce Schneier, among others, argues that strength of algorithm is not a reliable determinant of security of information. That most successful attacks occur through more accessible weaknesses, the prime one being human. Bruce reviews several of these in his October 15 Crypto-Gram, and refers to his latest book for more cybersecurity threats that crypto cannot defend. Ross Anderson, among others (some here), claim that chips are readily vulnerable to tampering, and that poses a much greater risk than algo attacks. Programs and people which just grab info directly from your box and bunker through B&E software and black bag jobs cannot be stopped by mathematics, though encrypted info might remain inaccessible. Lifting electromagnetically emanated data, say, that from keyboard to cpu, before it is encrypted, is still a threat, not limited to classified technology, as demonstrated by Ross Anderson, Markus Kuhn and others, and reviewed here recently. Cryptanalysis may be the most crucial technology in the world today, as it has been well before mathematical encipherment. How it is being done is probably the most closely guarded secret, and part of that protection is zero information. Share encryption information, yes, but not decrypt, not even a hint. Blow sunshine about algo strength and unbreakability, yes, that would be in order. What intrigues is the national security benefit of fostering the growth of public encryption, despite the claims that it makes global surveillance more difficult. If a public encryption enterprise didn't exist it would have to be invented to divert the attackers from genuine threats and weaknesses, as well as embed in the public realm a technology for covert snooping inside the Medeco pretense. The question occurs: did PK crypto get leaked on purpose? How was it done?