--- begin forwarded text
Delivered-To: clips@philodox.com
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2005 15:57:37 -0400
To: "Philodox Clips List"
From: "R.A. Hettinga"
Subject: [Clips] But Wouldn't Warlords Take Over?
Reply-To: rah@philodox.com
Sender: clips-bounces@philodox.com
--- begin forwarded text
From: "Mises Daily Article"
To: "Mises Daily Article"
Subject: But Wouldn't Warlords Take Over?
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2005 09:30:03 -0400
Mailing-List: contact article-help@mises.biglist.com
July Special:
http://www.mises.org/store/Myth-of-National-Defense-The-P171C0.aspxThe
Myth of National Defense, 20% Off (from $25 to $20).
But Wouldn't Warlords Take Over?
by Robert Murphy
http://www.mises.org/story/1855[Posted on Thursday, July 07, 2005]
On two separate occasions in the last couple of weeks, people have asked
me a familiar question: In a system of anarcho-capitalism or
the free-market order, wouldnt society degenerate into constant battles
between private warlords? Unfortunately I didnt give adequate answers at
the times, but I hope in this article to prove the adage that later is
better than never.
APPLES AND ORANGES
When dealing with the warlord objection, we need to keep our comparisons
fair. It wont do to compare society A, which is filled with evil, ignorant
savages who live under anarchy, with society B, which is populated by
enlightened, law-abiding citizens who live under limited government. The
anarchist doesnt deny that life might be better in society B. What the
anarchist does claim is that, for any given population, the imposition of a
coercive government will make things worse. The absence of a State is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition to achieve the free society.
To put the matter differently: It is not enough to demonstrate that a
state of private-property anarchy could degenerate into ceaseless war,
where no single group is strong enough to subjugate all challengers, and
hence no one can establish order. After all, communities living under a
State degenerate into civil war all the time. We should remember that the
frequently cited cases of Colombia and now Iraq are not demonstrations of
anarchy-turned-into-chaos, but rather examples of
government-turned-into-chaos.
For the warlord objection to work, the statist would need to argue that a
given community would remain lawful under a government, but that the same
community would break down into continuous warfare if all legal and
military services were privatized. The popular case of Somalia, therefore,
helps neither side.http://www.mises.org/story/1855#_edn1[i] It is true
that Rothbardians should be somewhat disturbed that the respect for
non-aggression is apparently too rare in Somalia to foster the spontaneous
emergence of a totally free market community. But by the same token, the
respect for the law was also too weak to allow
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Somalia#Somali_Civil_Warthe
original Somali government to maintain order.
Now that weve focused the issue, I think there are strong reasons to
suppose that civil war would be much less likely in a region dominated by
private defense and judicial agencies, rather than by a monopoly State.
Private agencies own the assets at their disposal, whereas politicians
(especially in democracies) merely exercise temporary control over the
States military equipment. Bill Clinton was perfectly willing to
http://news.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1998/08/21/wemb2...fire
off dozens of cruise missiles when the Lewinsky scandal was picking up
steam. Now regardless of ones beliefs about Clintons motivations,
clearly Slick Willie would have been less likely to launch such an attack
if he had been the CEO of a private defense agency that could have sold the
missiles on the open market for
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-toma.html$569,000
each .http://www.mises.org/story/1855#_edn2[ii]
We can see this principle in the case of the United States. In the 1860s,
would large scale combat have broken out on anywhere near the same scale
if, instead of the two factions controlling hundreds of thousands of
conscripts, all military commanders had to hire voluntary mercenaries and
pay them a market wage for their services?
CONTRACT THEORY OF GOVERNMENT
I can imagine a reader generally endorsing the above analysis, yet still
resisting my conclusion. He or she might say something like this: In a
state of nature, people initially have different views of justice. Under
market anarchy, different consumers would patronize dozens of defense
agencies, each of which attempts to use its forces to implement
incompatible codes of law. Now its true that these professional gangs
might generally avoid conflict out of prudence, but the equilibrium would
still be precarious.
To avoid this outcome, my critic could elaborate, citizens put aside
their petty differences and agree to support a single, monopoly agency,
which then has the power to crush all challengers to its authority. This
admittedly raises the new problem of controlling the Leviathan, but at
least it solves the problem of ceaseless domestic warfare.
There are several problems with this possible approach. First, it assumes
that the danger of private warlords is worse than the threat posed by a
tyrannical central government. Second, there is the inconvenient fact that
no such voluntary formation of a State ever occurred. Even those citizens
who, say, supported the ratification of the U.S. Constitution were never
given the option of living in market anarchy; instead they had to choose
between government under the Articles of Confederation or government under
the Constitution.
But for our purposes, the most interesting problem with this objection is
that, were it an accurate description, it would be unnecessary for such a
people to form a government. If, by hypothesis, the vast majority of
peoplealthough they have different conceptions of justicecan all agree
that it is wrong to use violence to settle their honest disputes, then
market forces would lead to peace among the private police agencies.
Yes, it is perfectly true that people have vastly different opinions
concerning particular legal issues. Some people favor capital punishment,
some consider abortion to be murder, and there would be no consensus on how
many guilty people should go free to avoid the false conviction of one
innocent defendant. Nonetheless, if the contract theory of government is
correct, the vast majority of individuals can agree that they should settle
these issues not through force, but rather through an orderly procedure
(such as is provided by periodic elections).
But if this does indeed describe a particular population, why would we
expect such virtuous people, as consumers, to patronize defense agencies
that routinely used force against weak opponents? Why wouldnt the vast
bulk of reasonable customers patronize defense agencies that had
interlocking arbitration agreements, and submitted their legitimate
disputes to reputable, disinterested arbitrators? Why wouldnt the
private, voluntary legal framework function as an orderly mechanism to
settle matters of public policy?
Again, the above description would not apply to every society in history.
But by the same token, such warlike people would also fail to maintain the
rule of law in a limited State.
FREE RIDERS?
A sophisticated apologist for the Stateespecially one versed in mainstream
economicsmight come back with yet another justification: The reason a
limited government is necessary is that we cant trust the market to
adequately fund legitimate police forces. It may be true that 95 percent
of a population would have similar enough views with respect to justice
such that peace would obtain if they all contributed substantially to
defense agencies dedicated to enforcing their views.
However, the apologist could continue, if these police agencies have no
right to extract contributions from everyone who endorses their actions,
then they will be able to field a much smaller force. The market fails
specifically because of the free rider problem: When a legitimate firm
cracks down on a rogue agency, all law abiding people benefit, but in a
free market they would not be obliged to pay for this public good.
Consequently, rogue agencies, funded by malevolent outlaws, will have a
much wider scope of operation under anarchy.
Again, there are several possible replies to such a position. First, let
us reflect that a large standing army, ready to crush minority dissenters,
is not an unambiguously desirable feature of government.
Second, the alleged problem of free riders would not be nearly as
disastrous as many economists believe. For example, insurance companies
would internalize the externalities to a large degree. It may be true
that an inefficient number of serial killers would be apprehended if the
relevant detective and police agencies had to solicit contributions from
individual households. (Sure, everyone gets a slight benefit from knowing
a serial killer has been caught, but whether or not one person contributes
probably wont make the difference between capture or escape.)
Yet insurance companies that each held policies for thousands of people in
a major city would be willing to contribute hefty amounts to eliminate the
menace of a serial killer. (After all, if he kills again, one of these
companies will have to pay out hundreds of thousands of dollars to the
estate of the victim.) The same reasoning demonstrates that the free
market could adequately fund programs to contain rogue agencies.
Third, people need to really picture the nightmare scenario to see how
absurd it is. Imagine a bustling city, such as New York, that is initially
a free market paradise. Is it really plausible that over time rival gangs
would constantly grow, and eventually terrorize the general
public?http://www.mises.org/story/1855#_edn3[iii] Remember, these would
be admittedly criminal organizations; unlike the city government of New
York, there would be no ideological support for these gangs.
We must consider that in such an environment, the law-abiding majority
would have all sorts of mechanisms at their disposal, beyond physical
confrontation. Once private judges had ruled against a particular rogue
agency, the private banks could freeze its assets (up to the amount of
fines levied by the arbitrators). In addition, the private utility
companies could shut down electricity and water to the agencys
headquarters, in accordance with standard provisions in their contracts.
http://www.mises.org/store/Myth-of-National-Defense-The-P171C0.aspx
http://www.mises.org/store/Myth-of-National-Defense-The-P171C0.aspxThe
Myth of National Defense, 20% off
Of course, it is theoretically possible that a rogue agency could overcome
these obstacles, either through intimidation or division of the spoils, and
take over enough banks, power companies, grocery stores, etc. that only
full-scale military assault would conquer it. But the point is, from an
initial position of market anarchy, these would-be rulers would have to
start from scratch. In contrast, under even a limited government, the
machinery of mass subjugation is ready and waiting to be seized.
CONCLUSION
The standard objection that anarchy would lead to battling warlords is
unfounded. In those communities where such an outcome would occur, the
addition of a State wouldnt help. Indeed, the precise opposite is true:
The voluntary arrangements of a private property society would be far more
conducive to peace and the rule of law, than the coercive setup of a
parasitical monopoly government.
mailto:robert_p_murphy@yahoo.comRobert Murphy is an adjunct scholar of
the Mises Institute. He teaches economics at Hillsdale College. See the
Murphy http://www.mises.org/articles.asp?mode=a&author=MurphyArchive. Buy
his http://www.mises.org/store/Chaos-Theory-P190C0.aspxbook on the
stateless society. Discuss this article on
the http://www.mises.org/blogblog.
http://www.mises.org/story/1855#_ednref1[i] Having made this concession,
I should point out that
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Somalia#Recent_Historyanarcho-capitalists
can see their theories borne out in Somalia to some extent.
http://www.mises.org/story/1855#_ednref2[ii] Its true that this figure
would be lower for a private defense firm, since it would control costs
much better than the Pentagon. Nonetheless it is still true that a private
firm would husband its stockpile of weapons better than State officials.
http://www.mises.org/story/1855#_ednref3[iii] Let us also keep in mind
that currently, mob groups (1) do not extract anywhere near as much money,
nor kill as many people, as any government in a typical days work, and (2)
they derive their current strength from government prohibitions (on
gambling, drugs, prostitution, loan-sharking, etc.) and hence are not
representative at all of an anarchist world.
In response to many requests, it is now possible to set your credit-card
contribution to the Mises Institute to be recurring. You can easily set
this up on-line with a donation starting at $10 per month. See the
https://www.mises.org/donate.aspMembership Page. This is one way to
ensure that your support for the Mises Institute is ongoing.
http://www.mises.org/story/1855[Print Friendly Page]
http://www.mises.org/store/
http://www.mises.org/elist.aspMises Email List Services
https://www.mises.org/donate.aspJoin the Mises Institute
http://www.mises.org/storeMises.org Store
http://www.mises.org/Home | http://www.mises.org/about.aspAbout |
http://www.mises.org/elist.aspEmail List |
http://www.google.com/u/MisesSearch |
http://www.mises.org/contact.aspContact Us |
http://www.mises.org/journals.aspPeriodicals |
http://www.mises.org/articles.aspArticles |
http://www.mises.org/fun.aspGames & Fun
http://www.mises.org/fun.aspFAQ |
http://www.mises.org/StudyGuideDisplay.asp?SubjID=117EBooks |
http://www.mises.org/scholar.aspResources |
http://www.mises.org/catalog.aspCatalog |
https://www.mises.org/donate.aspContributions |
http://www.mises.org/calendar.aspFreedom Calendar
You are subscribed as: rah@ibuc.com
Manage
http://mises.biglist.com/list/article/?p=prefs&pre=l&e=13958347&pw=1tyvx5togcyour
account. Unsubscribe
http://mises.biglist.com/list/article/?m=423&p=unsub&pre=l&e=13958347&pw=1tyvx5togc&msgnum=423here
or send email to mailto:article-unsub-13958347@mises.biglist.comthis
address.
Report abuse or Spam on the
http://mises.biglist.com/abuse/article/13958347/423abuse page.
--- end forwarded text
--
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
_______________________________________________
Clips mailing list
Clips@philodox.com
http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips
--- end forwarded text
--
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'