http://nytimes.com/2004/08/29/nyregion/29pipeline.html August 29, 2004 Mapping Natural Gas Lines: Advise the Public, Tip Off the Terrorists By IAN URBINA John Young says he is an agent for change, hoping to point out places where the government needs to bolster national security. Since 1996, he has been posting documents on his Web site, ranging from detailed maps of nuclear storage facilities in New Mexico to aerial photographs of police preparations for the Republican National Convention. He has never attracted much attention from the authorities, and what he does is fully legal. But last month, Mr. Young, a 68-year-old architect originally from Odessa, Tex., began publishing maps and pictures of natural gas pipelines in New York City on his site (www.cryptome.org). One photograph was of a large sign in Midtown Manhattan warning about the presence of a major gas main, a sign that had been meant to prevent deadly accidents. Within a week, the company that owns the pipeline took the sign down. "They posted the signs because they thought someone might accidentally blow the pipeline up,'' Mr. Young said. "Now, they're taking them down because they think someone might intentionally blow it up.'' For Mr. Young - and for a range of experts across the country - the strange and unnoticed little episode in Manhattan underscores one of the great tensions of the post-9/11 world: how to balance the desire for secrecy with decisions on what is best for public safety. Few issues highlight that tension better than the topic of natural gas. Private industry and local governments have spent much of the last several decades trying to make natural gas pipelines safer by publicizing where they are. Natural gas, highly explosive and transported in pipes underneath unknowing residents or uncharted along waterways, has been the cause of scores of lethal accidents - fiery explosions caused by misdirected backhoes or wayward boat anchors. But recent concerns have pushed in the opposite direction. Increasingly, gas companies have been clearing their Web sites of pipeline maps previously used by contractors before excavating. Almost all nautical charts once indicated where gas pipes run. Fewer do now. "Federal regulations require companies to make these lines as obvious as possible and educate the public about where they are,'' said Kelly Swan, a spokesman for Williams, the company that owns the pipe supplying Manhattan. "But local laws indicate that we were allowed to get rid of that particular sign, and after the recent publicity about it, we did.'' Edward M. Stroz, a retired F.B.I. agent who runs his own consulting firm on security issues, said many infrastructure companies found themselves caught between old risks and new threats. "The challenge is to make this infrastructure not so obvious that it's almost inviting to terrorists,'' he said, "while also not pulling so much information out of public reach that accidents occur.'' Natural gas arrives in New York City through six so-called city gates, reached after traveling thousands of miles in pipes running from deposits deep beneath southeastern Texas and Sable Island, off the east coast of Nova Scotia. Here it enters a local grid of smaller pipes owned by Consolidated Edison in Manhattan, the Bronx and portions of Queens, and owned by Keyspan in the rest of the city. The gas is used for heating, cooking, and increasingly for fuel in city power plants. But natural gas is also at risk of sabotage. "This tactic actually comes from our own playbook,'' said Thomas C. Reed, the former secretary of the Air Force under President Gerald R. Ford and the author of "At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War.'' In 1982, the C.I.A. hacked into the software that controlled Soviet natural gas pipelines, causing vital pumps, turbines and valves to go haywire, he explained. The result, Mr. Reed said, was the largest nonnuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space and a major blow to Soviet sales of natural gas to Western Europe. "The tactic was a stroke of genius,'' he said. Jose Padilla, the former Chicago gang member who grew up in Brooklyn, and who was accused of becoming an operative for Al Qaeda, intended to use natural gas to blow up three tall buildings, the authorities say. According to government documents, Mr. Padilla intended to rent apartments in three high-rise buildings that used natural gas, fill each apartment with fumes and detonate the three buildings simultaneously using timers. Security experts have repeatedly pointed to the natural gas pipeline system as a dangerous Achilles' heel in the domestic infrastructure. A report by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2002 said that city gates and compressor stations, which keep the gas moving through the pipelines, were most vulnerable. These critical nodes, the report explained, are usually above ground and sometimes protected only by chain-link fences and padlocks. If even one or two of these locations were disabled in any major city, the report said, it could result in a wide blackout since most new turbines being brought online in major cities are powered by natural gas. A 2002 report conducted by the National Academy of Sciences drew the same conclusion, explaining that restoring power after an attack on the natural gas system could take several weeks since spare parts for many of the mechanisms, especially those at compressor stations, are expensive, hard to find and often made only overseas. The report also predicted logistical challenges: every nonelectronic pilot light in the city would have to be manually relighted to avoid explosions. "We take security of natural gas very seriously,'' a Con Ed spokesman, Joe Petta, said. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, Con Ed has added fencing, cameras, and patrols around gas pipeline facilities, he said. The utility has also begun inspecting pipeline valves monthly, and four times a year it tests responses to city gate failures, he said. "None of that will help,'' said Mr. Young, standing about 30 feet and a chain-link fence from one of the four central pipes that feed natural gas to Manhattan. Even if certain facilities were patrolled around the clock, he said, and most are not, the rest of the system is still exposed. "The fact that pipelines run largely underground reduces their exposure to external threats,'' said a study concerning infrastructure safety conducted by the Congressional Research Service in 2002. But required markings alert emergency workers, homeowners and terrorists to the location of pipelines. This is today's central conundrum, Mr. Young said, adding that he will continue posting on his Web site the results of his daily prowls searching for weak spots. In the meantime, he added, "I imagine law enforcement will probably be keeping an eye on me.'' In fact, Mr. Young got his first visit from F.B.I. agents several weeks ago. But the issue was not all the nuclear reactor information he has put in the public domain. Rather, they wanted to talk about the natural gas pipeline maps, he said. Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company