On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:
and wait for the next time something happens if you're on DHCP, or they may have to get the cooperation of one or more other governments if your login trail runs outside their jurisdiction -- but ultimately, it's traceable.
You apparently don't even understand how even simple remailer chains work.
Hello, earth to Tim. (1) You can send anonymous mail by sending it through a remailer, but (2) The remailers themselves are not anonymous. (3) If the remailers *were* anonymous, they could not operate because then the users would not know where to send their mails.
As long as the remailers themselves are traceable, make no mistake: they exist only because the lions have not yet passed a law against them.
This may yet be attempted but even so success is not a given.
You cannot have encryption technologies advancing and leaving the law behind, so long as any vital part of the infrastructure you need is traceable and pulpable by the law.
Bear
I think you mean "palpable." I don't think pulpable is good usage but if by that you mean able to be made into pulp well, OK, it's funny. I haven't read the mixmaster source but it seems to me that end-to-end encryption protects the contents. The traffic analysis part seems vulnerable on two basic fronts : subversion of a node and overall low traffic levels. Nested encryption protects a subverted node from being able to trace the entire chain in one fell swoop. As long as there is one uncompromised node in a chain subversion doesn't guarantee a matchup of "from" and "to" but it improves the odds. With low traffic levels through a chain the statistics of traffic analysis are also improved. I like the idea of making a remailer part of a worm but it might be just as well to make it an inherent part of a product since people will attempt to eradicate a worm. Just imagine if Napster were still going full steam with a built-in remailer - huge node count and shitloads of traffic. Mike