Petro writes:
At 2:39 PM -0500 10/7/98, Steve Bryan wrote:
David Honig wrote:
I'd guess that the Export control puppets know that the Web-TV hubs will be subpoena-able by the US even in these other "sovereign" nations. The WebTV centralized infrastructure makes this easy.
This is as others have noted cisco's doorbelling approach to GAK -- having routers and automated systems doing decryption, and allowing LEA either direct access (possibly in this case), or access via complicit operators. One question which might help determins just how bad this Web TV thing is, is does it use the forward secret ciphersuites. If it did use FS ciphersuites, if the LEA starts reading traffic after some point (by asking the WebTV operators to do so, or by using a special LEA operator mode), he can't get all old traffic. The EDH (ephemeral DH) modes are forward secret because a new DH key is generated for each session. Some of the RSA modes are forward secret, but only on export grade RSA key sizes (512 bit). As it got export permission, I fear the worst. Perhaps even special LEA operator access. Adam