On Tue, 25 Sep 2001, Karsten M. Self wrote:
Future verifiability?
The thought crossed my mind.
This has been discussed multiple times. Tim just mentioned another obvious reason: the key may be held by certain individual readers of the list, but not the public in general. (Not likely to be the case in this particular instance, because of Hushmail's problems, but certainly a valid reason.) Signed messages can become a liability. Why provide potentially dangerous information to those who do not need it?
Someone got cluesticks for me WRT cypherpunks list protocol, and/or the cypherpunks listmanager WRT RFC 2015?
Cluesticks for you WRT mailing lists in general: don't use PGP/MIME. (Hint: try to verify a PGP/MIME signed message in a web archive. Or try to verify it with NAI's Outlook plugin. Or any number of other normally PGP-aware apps. Again, this has been discussed numerous times before.) History will set you free, grasshopper. http://www.inet-one.com/cypherpunks -MW-