This sort of stuff will only go on for a few more years until the
distributed process and universal namespace sorts of approaches replace
the current paradigms. When that happens losing a laptop will mean nothing
because it won't have the data 'on it' in the conventional sense.

On Sun, 24 Feb 2002, John Young wrote:

> We've noted here the rise in "lost" and "stolen" laptops
> containing sensitive and classified information. First,
> one or two disappeared while a spook was drunk or
> was left behind in a taxi or taken from an unidentified
> location.
>
> Then amazing reports of more losses, the number rising
> quickly, finally with surveys revealing hundreds of laptops
> have been lost by spooks, cops, senior officals, nuclear
> labs, state departments, and so on. Now and then encryption
> is mentioned.
>
> We can see that the lost laptop, and its recent corollary,
> the discovered laptop, has become as useful for disinformation
> as what is being found in newly revealed secret archives
> like those reported today in the Wash Post, "Spies, Lies and
> the Distortion of History:"
>
>
> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55522-2002Feb23.html
>
> To be sure, the flood of lost laptops both diminishes the
> credibility of what is on the laptops and increases it. One way
> to increase credibility is to claim files are encrypted.
>
> What we also know is that encrypted files are now a leading
> indicator of credibility, along with the shadowy and enticing
> methods used to decrypt by unidentified parties, and to then
> carefully distribute the decrypted, authenticated thereby,
> if demonized, material.
>
> Whether there is actually sensitive material in the demonized
> files is hard to determine so long as access to the original
> files, and a credible account of how they were comeby is
> not made available. As with the long history of astonishing
> revelations of secrets, lies and videotapes.
>
> Moving to a related topic, is the use of the Internet for
>
> leaking and/or psyopping disinformation, in particular
> the use of honeypots.
>
> Cryptome is occasionally charged with being a honeypot,
> and it could be, wittingly so if we are succesful in putting
> up lurid material to bring in more luridities. A question
> though is what information is being gathered by Cryptome
> honeypot? The access logs, the pattern and content of
> publication, the receipt of hot material, the distribution
> of lies and deceptions? And if these are the profits of the
> honeypot how is the data collection about them being
> done?
>
> We dream of being able to watch the honeypot harvestors
> at work, which accounts for admitting to running a honeypot,
> our lost laptop if you will. This hoary rabbit-running practice,
> you being the rabbit, as we see here with several practitioners,
> carries a Daniel Pearl-like risk. You may well lose your head
> to somebody who believes you are a wolf not merely a
> headgames-player.
>