Wasn't it pointed out quite a while ago, here if no where else, that all digital communications and data were susceptible to covert "radiological tagging," including those encrypted? I don't recall what protection against that was proposed or developed, but it was seen to be so likely that countermeasures were essential, but not necessarily to be disclosed publicly any more than your passphrase. Now it is always hard to tell what are spoof vulnerabilities, disinfo, and real ones, but spoof almost certainly outnumber the real ones for that is a common offense against attackers: to cloud clear and obscure vulnerabilities with confabulated clear and obscure ones. The way broken security continues in use to mislead those who are dumbfounded that such cluelessness occurs: to with the Iran security services continuing to use a cracked crypto system after news reports about it. Weak comsec is like orchestrated leaks, fools fall in love with them, seduced by a belief of superiority and good fortune. The one about the Russians one-time misuse of a one-time pad leading to cracking VENOA as if that was all there was to. Telegraph hands in the old days were quite good at simulating hands, and cross-talk in wiring was used to leak believable information because of the faith the snoopers had that nobody was aware of the intercepts. William Arkin listed a few days ago on his Washpo blog some 500 programs in use by US spooks to surveil for threats, and some of those might be more than smoke and sunshine but most are sci-fi used to promote NSA pantopticonic flim-flam. The most valuable intelligence is obtained by human betrayal and the humongous hardware on land, undersea and space which gets credit is an effective cloak. Bribing for info is still the most cost effective, but the US economy doesn't benefit from that petty pork compared to big iron on land, undersea and in space.