To Jim Bell and "Black Unicorn": I have been following your debate with interest, and would like to re-iterate some points that were made and add some of my own. The concept of encrypting a key before escrowing it is excellent. It prevents the escrow agent from misusing the key, and protects the principal from government snooping. If the escrow agent is served a subpoena, he can say, "Here is the key you want. Go ahead and take it. In fact, here is my entire key database. All keys are encrypted by the principals before I get them, so I can't guarantee that you will be able to use them, but here they are anyway." At this point, the LEO's can take whatever they want, but the principals are still safe. The escrow agent doesn't have to send any encrypted "rosebud" message to anyone, and he can bend over backwards to make the LEO's happy, so his butt is covered, too. At this point, the LEO's can either (a) send the keys to the NSA for decryption, and thereby admit that the gov't can break IDEA (or whatever cryptosystem was used to encrypt the keys before the escrow agent got them), (b) rubber hose the unencrypted key(s) from the principal, or (c) go home and pout. Of course, if you never escrow your keys, you can avoid the whole scenario altogether, leaving the gov't with options (b) and (c). Jonathan Wienke