I have a suggestion on building future remailers. Let's not overlook the idea of operating them "Out of band." At intervals ( preferably random) it would be possible to transmit messages via the phone network, or spread spectrum, to other remailers. (encrypted links of course)( encrypted UUCP?) This would make traffic analysis more difficult.
It would also be possible to bounce messages through diverters in other states, further hindering TA. This might also work well for random sources for one time pads.
Brian Williams
Furthermore, the continuing expansion of "private" networks--LANs and WANs, within companies, within households, within other entities that no government can plausibly claim monitoring authority over--will make Digital Telephony II and traffic analysis much harder to implement. When Alice send her remailer traffic down the hallway over her own Ethernet line to Bob, the confusion grows. Not necessariy any better than would be had with more ideal mixes, but certainly this sort of thing can only work to make traffic analysis more complicated. (Yes, the authorities can monitor all messages. But imagine what happens when a company with hundreds of PCs, workstations, multiple mini-networks, etc., gets into the remailer business.) The rapid growth of proprietary networks (such as the one linking me to my next door neighbor) makes Digital Telephony almost unenforceable. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."