-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've been very busy this week busting my chops on a networking project for a client, but I have to take a moment to add my own few comments. I realize that this is old news to some of you, but it appears that many of you seem to forget that a rather unpleasant trend seems to be developing within the law enforcement community. While we are voicing our opposition to the "Key-Escrow" proposal (known to most of us as Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack), there are other historical instances which are directly proportionate to where the LEAs are in relationship to their efforts at legislating technology. The point that I am attempting to make is that the "Key-Escrow" initiative is but another extension of the earlier Digital Telephony proposal introduced early last year (also known as "Son of S. 266"). As far as I'm concerned, the "Key-Escrow" initiative is an attempted continuance of a failed effort. Excerpted from "Digital Media: A Seybold Report," April 20 1992 volume 1, number 11, page 7, is one of the first reports of this failed attempt to legislate LEA access to communications on a broad scale - "Though not specifically listed as a target in the proposal, many people are calling Digital Telephony 'Son of S. 266,' a failed Senate bill that required the same 'dumbing-down' for encryption as the F.B.I. proposal does for phone systems. In other words, makers of encryption devices or software were to be required to leave a 'back door' open for law-enforcement and security agencies that wanted to decode encrypted communication. "The bill, of course, completely defeats the purpose of encryption - leaving the 'back door' open for the very same sophisticated techno-criminals that the agencies were trying to thwart. S. 266 was shouted down last year by outraged computer experts and civil libertarians. "At the CFP [CFP II - PF] conference, encryption expert Whitfield Diffie said, 'I understand why the police don't like [encryption]. But a very large part of the essence of a free versus totalitarian society consists of the difference between being answerable for your actions and being subject to prior restraint against actions the society doesn't approve of.'" [End of excerpt] Additionally, later in the article, a summary list is provided which outlined the proposal, which is excerpted below - "The F.B.I. proposal The following is taken directly from a Federal Bureau of Investigation document distributed to legislators and other concerned parties in Washington, DC. Digital Telephony: Summary of Issues * The F.B.I. utilizes electronic surveillance (wire taps) in virtually every area of its investigative responsibilities. * The telecommunications industry, which remained virtually unchanged for approximately 50 years, is now rapidly changing to address the need for more advanced telecommunications systems, such as personal communications networks, advanced cellular and integrated services digital networks (ISDN) which have the capacity for high-speed transmissions of video, voice and data. * One of the telephone telecommunications industry's major developmental efforts is to provide total digital connectivity (end to end) for its subscribers, including residential and business communities, in the near future. * At present, no capability exists to intercept ISDN (digital) transmissions; therefore, the emergence of digital telecommunications technology will preclude the F.B.I. and all of law enforcement from being able to intercept electronic communications, thus all but eliminating a statutorily-sanctioned, court-authorized and extraordinarily successful investigate technique. * The Department of Justice and the F.B.I. have been working with the White House, various Administration agencies, the telecommunications industry and Congress to find a workable solution to this very serious problem that endangers the safety of the American public. A legislative solution has been developed to ensure that the legitimate need for law enforcement to lawfully intercept communications is met by the telecommunications industry. Legislative Remedy The proposal would amend the Communications Act of 1934 to require providers of electronic communications services and private branch exchanges to ensure that the Government's ability to lawfully intercept communications is unimpeded by the introduction of advanced digital telecommunications technology or any other emerging telecommunications technology. Specifically, the amendment provides the following: 1. The FCC, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall determine the technological interception needs of the Government and issue regulations that will preserve the Government's ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance. 2. The FCC shall issue regulations within 120 days after enactment requiring the modification of existing telecommunication systems if those systems impede the Government's ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance. 3. Compliance by service providers and private branch exchanges will be required within 180 days of the issuance of the regulations and the use of non-conforming equipment is prohibited thereafter. 4. The FCC has the authority to compensate (through rate structure) telecommunication system operators under FCC jurisdiction for reasonable costs associated with required modifications of existing telecommunications equipment or technology. 5. The Attorney General has specific authority, in addition to that already vested in the FCC, to seek civil penalties and injunctive relief for non-compliance." [End of excerpt] Of course, this bill died on "The Hill" because of lack of support. It does suggest, however, that this is the tell-tale sign of a continuing effort by the law enforcement community (which is grasping at straws) to find ways to exploit domestic communications due to the increasing complexity of technological advances in that area. LEAs are also using highly volatile topics as drug enforcement and terrorism as justification. While being politically correct, this does not justify the scrutiny of private communications without reasonable justification. Hey -- you don't have to get whacked across the head with a 2x4 to see the writing on the wall. Clipper is an offering by a kinder, gentler government. Clipper/Capstone offers a method to secure your communications for you, with a "Key-Escrow" system, a GW (Gee Whiz) chip set whose internals are classified and a premise of good faith. I'm certainly no sage with a crystal ball, but I can't help but wonder which trump card will be played next. Whatever it is, I get the feeling that it is not good. Cheers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLBfG+5RLcZSdHMBNAQGO/gQApCXzaIxktfKTpK7nBJUrw1tRzXmw6twR zYPjKYKdiJ9lQ6qPrUwbCGccPjN2Gnv7MP29H782ixzA7wMbMo47SkMbVA2fpxzp 2SpXRYmhkwMNdbD03nooF8QN2qwN6X7FtZ7yCelCf4X+TDXVEN+EAKu+g2AH5rKm 7q0aTzJgKPg= =D3Pp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Paul Ferguson | The future is now. Network Integrator | History will tell the tale; Centreville, Virginia USA | We must endure and struggle fergp@sytex.com | to shape it. Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.