Hal writes: : One : of the elements of the offense of violating the arms export control act : is that the violation be willful. The exporter has to violate a known : legal duty not to export the item. One of the reasons for this is simply : that the ITAR list is long and technical and average individuals cannot be : expected to know all its details. This is mentioned in the Lizarraga : case, at approximately 541 F2d 828: . . . . : So in this case I think widespread publicity about the ITARs can be : considered harmful. All those helpful people going around warning others : that they are exporting software are actually removing a defense against : charges of export. This is a serious problem. On the other hand there are civil penalties for violating the ITAR that can be imposed without any showing of willfulness. So the non-willfull exporter is still at risk, even if he does not know it. And if people are not informed in general, then the boys from the Office of Defense Trade Controls and NSA, can selectively inform only those whom they wish to harass, which is perhaps the nastiest aspect of the ITAR. The only long term solution is to establish that the ITAR's provisions relating to cryptographic software are unconstitutional and void. -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH Internet: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu