I faxed this out last night. The press release is our next step. We are looking to put together a more detailed, more technologically savvy version to send to computer mags and stuff. Those who want to help, subscribe to sea-media-request@panix.com. We can use your help on this next version. -S. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Society for Electronic Access Post Office Box 3131 Church Street Station New York, NY 10008-3131 Internet: sea@panix.com Phone Contact: Steve Barber, (212) 787-8421 April 23, 1993 Via Fax: (212) 556-3690 Letters to the Editor The New York Times 229 West 43rd St. New York, NY 10036 Dear Editor: Last week the Clinton Administration proposed a new standard for encrypting telephone messages and other electronic transmissions (see John Markoff's articles in the New York Times, "Electronics Plan Aims to Balance Government Access With Privacy," April 16, 1993, p. A1, and "Communications Plan Draws Mixed Reaction," April 17, 1993, p. 35). The announcement took by surprise many people who are concerned with the security and privacy of digital communications. The Society for Electronic Access, an organization concerned with civil liberties and access issues involving computers, believes that the government is acting with undue speed in its desire to begin widespread use of the "Clipper chip" in six months, before the full implications of its plans have been explored. We strongly believe that more thought and study should be directed to the government's decision. In its haste to mediate between the desire of government agencies to intercept unlawful communications and the right of citizens to privacy, the administration may end up promoting a plan that is responsive to neither side. Among the issues that raise serious concerns: + Other encryption techniques currently in wide use have been subjected to rigorous public scrutiny, but the "Skipjack" algorithm embodied in Clipper is secret. No one knows whether it may contain unforeseen vulnerabilities or even deliberately-inserted backdoors for easy decoding. Examination by a government-picked panel of cryptographic experts is not sufficient to guarantee its security -- and certainly not the abbreviated examination that would be possible under the administration's fast-track plan for putting Clipper into service. At a very minimum, the Administration has an obligation to allow inspection by more independent experts, and to say why this scheme must be kept private, while other encryption standards of the past two decades have been widely published + The proposal to hold user's keys in escrow for wiretapping is inadequately defined. No one knows who will hold the keys, how they will protect the key database from illicit access or how a Clipper phone might be re-secured once its keys have been released for tapping. (Consider, by the way, that a magnetic tape cartridge holding keys for all the telephones in America could fit in a shirt pocket.) Such crucial issues should be settled before Clipper is even considered. + By throwing its weight behind the Clipper chip, the government appears to be unfairly subsidizing a handful of companies at the expense of the rest of the U.S. telecommunications industry. (Indeed, others who have attempted to develop secure communications equipment have as often as not found roadblocks thrown in their way.) The rationale for awarding such an enormous potential windfall is unclear. + Because the Clipper chip is not intended for export, U.S. companies that adopt it could be at a serious disadvantage in international markets. They would have to develop and maintain dual product lines or else cede the global competition for secure telecommunications to other nations. The government should abandon its attempt to rush Clipper-based equipment into the market until these and other issues have been addressed. Although introduction of the Clipper chip does not (at least at the moment) appear intended to foreclose the development and sale of other encryption technologies, the government's preferred solution is likely to have a strong impact. If it turns out to be vulnerable, or if it impedes the entry of U.S. firms into the international market for secure telecommunications, both our constitutional freedoms and our economic competitiveness will be severely damaged. Any technology that bears such risks must be subjected to thorough public scrutiny and open debate before a decision is made on whether to adopt it. Sincerely, Simona Nass President Board of Directors: Stacy Horn Joe King John McMullen Simona Nass Lance Rose, Esq. Alexis Rosen Paul Wallich