Responding to msg by tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) on Tue, 20 Sep 10:40 AM
I agree with Hal Finney's point that current remailers are far from the "ideal mix" described by Chaum and are basically not very good at what they are supposed to do.
[Snip]
[Hal says]
Claims here that remailers are designed to support sedition or to prevent government surveillance are both wrong and harmful. This kind of material could show up at some future prosecution of a remailer operator.
[Snip] [Tim says]
Maybe. This is why I brought up the "supporting terrorists" language of the Crime Act.
Hal and Tim point to the vulnerability of the person running the remailer to being threatened through the equipment owner (like John Perry's recent experience) or squeezed by government agents into playing along with surveillors. This isolation and elimination (or co-optation) of a target has worked again and again to destroy networks once they become serious threats to law and order. Hal's warning is wisely heeded until all the remailer beneficiaries are bear an equal share of the risks of being charged a "supporting terrorist". John