I keep looking at the whole stego thing. But the basic problem remains the same. Stego relies on the *method* being secret, which stands in stark contrast to kerchoff's principle. I mean, sure, you can stego encrypted stuff so nobody who recovers it can read it, but if you use any of the "available" programs, there will always be utilities that can detect your encrypted stuff and, usually, extract it. In a proper stego system, the stegotext must be *undetectable* by people who don't have the key -- even if they have the stego program used. I don't know of any which meet that criteria. For one thing they mostly work on lowest-significant-bits and leave the rest of the carrier text alone. It's pretty simple to detect that the LSB's have increased entropy, or represent inconsistent gradients of color on the smallest scales. One thing that is an absolute dead giveaway, and I see a lot of stegograms out there that have this built in, is that in graphic files, the number of pixels is increased by interpolation, either in the digital camera/scanner, or after the image is made by a graphics editor, before the steganography is done. The problem with this is that interpolation is done by highly predictable algorithms which dictate the relationships of each pixel (including the LSB) to its neighbors. When you take this regular system of linear-equations-with-a-simultaneous-solution and then impose your stegotext on it, it stands out like a sore thumb. *sigh*. I will not use a stego system unless I write it first and my recipient has the only other copy. Because it's a matter of keeping the *method* secret, that's really the only way. Bear