I want to clarify some points about my earlier posting on how remailer fees fix the "anonymous flooding" problem which Marc Ringuette mentioned. Implicit in my comments were some assumptions which I ought to break out separately: * The current Internet, glorious as it is, is not the likely long term solution. The various bans and constraints on business interactions, on fees, on commercial use, etc., are major limits to what we're talking about here. (Some alternatives exist, like Alternet (sp?), but Internet is what most of us are now using.) * "Remailing fees" are the natural, free market solution to the costs of transmitting, decrypting, storing, and forwarding messages. But these fees run afoul of various Internet rules. * The Internet policy statements are often invoked by sysadmins and would-be censors (David Sternlight comes to mind) who are worried about uses, abuses, and out of the ordinary situations. Ditto for Prodigy and similar systems. The talk about bans on anonymous mail (nothing seriously proposed, so far as I know) reflect the government-dominated nature of the current Internet. * Though what we are doing with anonymous mail, remailers, digital pseudonyms, and even digital money is educational and even fun, I doubt any of us expects our "constructions" to persist, to be a real foundation for future digital economies. Well, at least I don't expect much to last. Instead, what we learn with these systems will be carried over to new kinds of networks, or on radically evolved descendants of today's networks. * These new kinds of networks may look more like descendants of FIDONet than of the Internet, in the sense of being more decentralized and outside the control of institutions and government agencies. (Some have argued that the Internet is already transnational and is already beyond the control of governments. This sounds plausible in theory, but in practice most Internet users _are_ subject to various rules about usage, about noncommercial use, etc.) * Some on this list have expressed distaste that remailing will have to be _paid for_ by someone (other than themselves). This is the way economics works. Remailers will act on the profit motive, and this in fact will do more to increase the numbers and types of remailers than anything else. When "Mom and Pop" remailer sites can be set up for the cost of a PC, hard disk, and perhaps a "hardware mix" (a Chaum-style tamper-resistant module which mixes incoming messages, stores them for sufficient latency, then remails them), then the profit motive will ensure lots of these remailers. * I'm not saying the current Internet will not evolve into such a network. In fact, the rapid growth in many countries and on many platforms may mean it already has enough momentum to become the type of network we need to develop these cyberspace constructs. But it's possible the form will be quite different. My crude timetable for the spread of crypto anarchy still has the 1993-5 period as a time of experimentation (such as we're doing), with more robust, profit-oriented enterprises appearing around 1996 or so. (A few brave souls may enter the market even earlier.) -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.