One idea that came up a while back was a sort of limited tracking of mail -- an example would be keeping a hash of the email address where mail was received from for 48 hours, with the hash value being attached to the peice of mail as a header.
This would accomplish two things: We could source block an address without knowing the source; and if push came to shove an address could be backtracked to its original source, provided a complaint was made in time, and that the Bad Guy sent another mail from the same address. I think that legally there would be a good argument that the remailer ops had made a reasonable attempt and holding lawbreakers accountable, while still preserving the anonymity of non-abusers.
This would have two problems (I think :): 1) How do you tell that the source address isn't a remailer? If things go to the disposeable remailer heads (Aren't those bad for the environment or something? :), you might wind up blocking part of the remailer chain. 2) Depending on the strength the hash function, there's a trail that you submitted traffic into the remailer network for that 48 hours. Not that sendmail/packet sniffing wouldn't show the same thing w/o IP layer encryption . . . . Now if there was a DC net you could submit traffic/noise into that would deliver into the remailer net . . . . --- Fletch __`'/| fletch@ain.bls.com "Lisa, in this house we obey the \ o.O' ______ 404 713-0414(w) Laws of Thermodynamics!" H. Simpson =(___)= -| Ack. | 404 315-7264(h) PGP Print: 8D8736A8FC59B2E6 8E675B341E378E43 U ------