Paul, you of all people don't need to feel slighted when I urge people to do something, anything, about the wiretap chips. Therefore, let me rephrase my exhortation to the list at large. If you are doing something, continue. If you are not, start. The particulars of what one does are not so nearly important to me as that one does something. Anyone who understands at least one tenth of this list understands more than your average reporter. While I would like all the details to be perfectly accurate everywhere, this is not going to happen. Even if you don't feel like you are an expert, you are more expert than most. With the aid of the documents in the ftp site, and a few hours time, you can become even more expert.
Is there something going on with the EFF that we should know about?
The EFF is going to be involved with the cryptography issue. More than that and I defer to John Gilmore, who is on the EFF board and this list and who can speak more authoritatively than I.
I know what you mean, however, many of the crypto-warriors which may follow do not. It may be a good idea to _now_ place a broad policy statement.
Here is my own very short version of my policy toward the wiretap chips: "The government has no right to restrict my use of cryptography in any way. They may not forbid me to use whatever ciphers I may like, nor may they require me to use any that I do not like." The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's issue by comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key escrow system 'work.' Do not be suckered into talking about an issue that is not important. If someone want to talk about potential back doors, refuse to speculate. The existence of a front door (key escrow) make back door issues pale in comparison. If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works, refuse to elaborate. Saying that this particular key escrow system is bad has a large measure of complicity in saying that escrow systems in general are OK. Always argue that this particular key escrow system is bad because it is a key escrow system, not because it has procedural flaws. This right issue is that the government has no right to my private communications. Every other issue is the wrong issue and detracts from this central one. If we defeat one particular system without defeating all other possible such systems at the same time, we have not won at all; we have delayed the time of reckoning. Trenchantly yours, Eric