From: baum@newton.apple.com (Allen J. Baum) But, there is one thing that is true about NSA's ability to crack it: they won't give you cause to know whether they can or not.
This statement, like the following, is like a rich vein of valuable insight into the extra-technical aspects of the issue. I found myself reading this next part over several times, and each pass I found that I associated what I understood to other unspoken questions I have.
e.g., if they can, and they read some mail of yours that you REALLY don't want them to read, they won't act on that information in such a manner that you can determine that they cracked the code for your message. They couldn't use it on a warrant, & they couldn't testify as to its contents in court. To do so would advertise their capabilities, which is a no-no for them. (they might, of course, use that information to point people in the right direction so they can attribute information to an anonymous tip, but they have to be careful even there)
and thus revealing that if you become a target of genuine scorn from that corner, it will operate from a position which is beyond accountability itself. I think that Doug Barnes hit the nail on the head by pointing out that sheer volume of stuff to filter through has the potential of affording us an edge.
Even now, when it's pretty certain they could crack DES, you won't find them doing it for a law enforcement agency that asks; it gives away too much.
Anything you are *required* to keep secret, is more valuable to the *requiring agency* than to you. Anything you are expected to accept on faith, can't be proven. LUX ./. owen