----- Original Message ----- From: "Sarad AV" <jtrjtrjtr2001@yahoo.com> Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 5:55 AM Subject: Regarding Windows Vista Disk Encryption Algorithm.
How do we know if future PC's make use of this chip on their motherboards in future
The short answer: they do.
and how can we trust this chip?
If you can't trust the hardware vendor there are worse things they can do to you. But in essence you either trust them or you don't.
Doesn't a data recovery expert usually work under the assumption that the encryption keys are unavailable?
This changes the rules some, but generally speaking with modern encryption, if the key is not available you're screwed.
Isn't this the case, if we are looking at stolen laptop(S)? If the disk can be removed and dumped, what advantage does the TPM security chip provide over software encryption?
You missed the part where it can only be done with the administrator password.
But if we work with the assumption that the attacker/ recovery expert will not be able to find the key on the disk ,is there any need to implement the TMP security chip? Is the assumption reasonable?
There is no reason to hide the boot block, but too many uneducated users would go "But they can find the boot block" and complain about how the security MUST be weak, based on a gross misunderstanding of the situation.
From the above, judging by the clock speed, it however appears that AES-CBC is software implemented by BitLocker?
I don't know.
Appendix A on pg 18 gives a sketch of a proof on why AES-CBC+Diffusers are atleast as secure as AES-CBC. The diffusers consumes about 1/3 rd of the cycles per byte. Given this overhead is it useful to implement the diffusers unless the implementation can be shown to be more secure than AES-CBC?
Without the introduction of another key it is impoosible to improve on the security proof of CBC, so what they've done is introduce a method of obfuscation that they hope will not be broken, but breaking it will not affect the security of CBC mode in any way, simply because if it did break AES-CB, an attacker could apply it themself quite cheaply. The proof basically boils down to: it's CBC, attacker loses. Joe