-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sun, 28 Jul 1996, David Sternlight wrote:
Date: Sun, 28 Jul 1996 12:59:37 -0700 From: David Sternlight <david@sternlight.com> To: Deranged Mutant <WlkngOwl@unix.asb.com>, John Young <jya@pipeline.com>, cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: WaPo on Crypto-Genie Terrorism
At 5:55 PM -0700 7/27/96, Deranged Mutant wrote:
On 27 Jul 96 at 19:21, John Young wrote:
[stuff skipped]
This, and similar remarks by others, consistently misses the point which I have been making for about a year now, and which Director Freeh finally made explicit in his testimony last week. That is--the government is concerned with mass market software incorporating robust crypto, used overseas, and recognizes that they can't keep niche products off the market, nor stop bad guys from using crypto the government would just as soon they didn't. Since the US has a hammerlock on that mass market, and since few would switch products to let the crypto tail wag the features dog (no slur intended), ITAR follows.
Hrmmm... "is concerned" I can understand, but banning it, or what we do with it, is definatly against the First Amendment.
Though I've no connection with Freeh, it's interesting that his language is almost word for word the same as what I've been using. Do you suppose some of his staff reads my stuff?
Until now we haven't seen such an open public admission of what the government is concerned about--probably because the State Department doesn't like to have an official spokesman admit we're mass monitoring and seining foreign traffic since it is an embarassment to the polite fiction of diplomatic relations (though I'm sure the truth is that every country with the capability does it).
yes, I'd say that every country that can does... but what does that have to do with anything?
[..]
with wiretapping. Mr. Freeh, testifying at Thursday's hearing in favor of an optional key escrow plan, noted that the point is not to prevent all copies of uncrackable code from going abroad -- that's clearly impossible -- but to prevent such high-level code from becoming the international standard, with architecture and transmission channels all unreadable to world authorities. To software companies and Internet users who
So why should criminals bother with using standards if they are readable by authorities?
See above.
have been clamoring for the right to encrypt as securely as possible, Mr. Freeh and others argue, "the genie is not yet out of the bottle" on "robust," meaning uncrackable, encryption.
Are they going to magically erase all copies of strong software that is already currently available? (Side note: the Pacifica news report on Friday notes that while Freeh gave his testimony, over 100 copies of PGP were downloaded from MIT's site.)
What he's saying is that US-exported copies of the Lotus Lockshens, Microsoft Machayas, and Netscape Niguns of the world still do not contain robust crypto the USG cannot read.
Which they should, I might add.
Particularly absent in the WaPo-ed is that many do not trust the authorities (in the US and elsewhere)--particularly the FBI, which has a long history of extra-legal surveillance.
So as Netanyahu says at length we need to build in protections against abuses, using both the legislature and the judiciary.
Oh, yes oh wise one. We need protections against free speech. The First Amendment was designed to hurt us. Seig Hiel! --Deviant The first version always gets thrown away. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMfvwjzAJap8fyDMVAQH3DAf7BXgEFQEYJebKjJAUTdg6y8PtweuyoBGZ SEXDQLrxSTQYc2XGHw917jT3SiYk2+gqD6I7I54dUeGUk1MvSFUsmEDYxdK6WYSs h3vLosEc+g+DPcX2C0mFafI2oImLmN4xmLfTnxaSnLXhCsYfbqze1xSzZeBgWKf9 8Ylf2WL8PoSnF6gCYY1axv4TAuagr/1J3Dz+pP4gC030JJpxAfvNo6cUMFLKV8i/ Jtt3C+TWVG4B9+6qmCiRZ7hEgerqHSKGH94zvQ9zNF5D7FuBR217mmX4bg5ZBcTy 57I54AfKnOCr3ZD9s43EqLL2pwnavMVdW+jvOPIGkHdnNEdc25rwIA== =6DT+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----