From m--@gmx.com Fri Jul 6 02:36:55 2018 From: Michael Rogers To: cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] Nash equilibrium on p2p networks Date: Fri, 06 Jul 2018 02:36:55 +0000 Message-ID: <172289271734.3881296.16038970689558846908.generated@mail.pglaf.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============5673596166256997804==" --===============5673596166256997804== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 07/03/12 20:05, James A. Donald wrote: > If I understand the proposed system > http://www.ee.ucl.ac.uk/~mrio/papers/infocom09.pdf correctly: > > Every entity has a public key. > > Leechers issue IOUs to seeders. This creates a network of IOUs. The > pledgeroute software looks for ways to cancel out IOUs, thus honoring > them - for example Ann seeds Bob, Bob seeds Carol, and Carol seeds Ann. > > If your IOUs get cancelled out, your key gains reputation, causing your > IOUs to be valued. > > It is not clear to me how the sybil attack is avoided: Is it that you > only gain reputation with those benefiting from the cancellation? If you consider a cluster of Sybils, the creator of the Sybils is free to create any structure of IOUs within the cluster, and any structure of IOUs from Sybils to non-Sybils. But IOUs from non-Sybils to Sybils can only be created by non-Sybils, and that only happens when the Sybils provide a service. No matter how many Sybils a person creates, the total debt owed to them by non-Sybils is limited by the total amount of service they provide. So there's no advantage in creating Sybils. It's not impossible - it's just pointless. I think that's how it works, anyway - it's been a while since I read the paper and I could be confusing it with the Sybilproof reputation mechanisms paper Matteo mentioned. Cheers, Michael _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE --===============5673596166256997804==--