These key storage and recovery issues are a prime focus of SatochiLabs
   Trezor series.
   [1]https://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-faq/overview.html
   Warrant Canary creator

   On Feb 16, 2017 6:35 PM, "James A. Donald" <[2]jamesd@echeque.com>
   wrote:

     On 2/17/2017 11:37 AM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:

     On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 10:47:15AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:

     It is unlikely that Trump would manage his own public keys - and he
     cannot
     trust the white house staff and government security people to manage
     them
     for him.  It is even more unlikely that Podesta would manage his own
     public
     keys.

     IPSEC was in principle the right approach in so far as "pre-emptive"
     or
     opportunistic "link" encryption (i.e., your communication channel,
     by
     default - as you say, zero clicks).

     Ipsec is not very secure.  What I was thinking of is a global
     database linking phone numbers, email addresses, etc, to public keys
     with a witness mechanism to ensure that every client gets told the
     same story as to which public key is associated with which phone
     number.
     So if your client looks up its own public key by phone number, it
     sees a hash chain connecting that association to the global witness
     hash, and knows that client it is talking to sees the same public
     key.  Clients upload and download public keys at infrequent
     intervals without human intervention.
     This works fine with phones, since people assume one phone number
     per physical phone.  Phone forwarding systems are assumed to forward
     from one phone number/physical device to another phone number
     physical device. Not so fine with email addresses. Just have to give
     people the option
     'Your emails are currently encrypted so that they can only be read
     on the following physical devices ...
     "Add current device to list for future emails?"
     "Edit list of devices that are empowered to decrypt your email?"
     Which interface is likely to confuse and irritate them.
     And if you lose or damage the physical device that currently holds
     all your old emails and you have not backed it up recently, thus
     losing all your old emails and the secret key that can decrypt them
     - that could be very handy if an investigation is coming up.

References

   1. https://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-faq/overview.html
   2. mailto:jamesd@echeque.com