From February this year:

     Website-Targeted False Content Injection by Network Operators
     Gabi Nakibly1,3, Jaime Schcolnik2, and Yossi Rubin3
     1 Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa, Israel
     2Computer Science Department, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya,
     Israel
     3Rafael – Advanced Defense Systems, Haifa, Israel
     Over the last few years there have been numerous reports of ISPs
     that alter or proxy their customers’ traffic, including, for
     example, CMA Communications in 2013 [6], Comcast in 2012 [16],
     Mediacom in 2011 [9], WOW! in 2008 [27], and Rogers in 2007 [32].
     Moreover, several extensive studies have brought the details of this
     practice to light [17, 30, 25, 35]. The main motivations of ISPs to
     alter traffic are to facilitate caching, inject advertisements into
     DNS and HTTP error messages, and compress or transcode content.
      All of these reports and studies found that these traffic
     alterations were carried out exclusively by edge ISPs,namely, retail
     ISPs that sell Internet access directly to end customers, and are
     their “first hop” to the Internet. This finding stems from the
     server-centric approach the above studies have taken. In this
     approach, one or a handful of servers are deployed to deliver
     specific content to users, after which a large number of clients are
     solicited to fetch that content from the servers. Finally, an agent
     on the clients – usually a JavaScript delivered by the server itself
     – looks for deviations between the content delivered by the server
     and that displayed to the user. Figure 1(a)illustrates the traffic
     monitored in this server-centric approach.
     Such an approach can be used to inspect the traffic of many clients
     from diverse geographies who are served by different edge ISPs. The
     main disadvantage of this approach is that the content fetched by
     the clients is very specific. All clients fetch the same content
     from the same web servers. This allows only the detection of network
     entities that aim to modify all of the Internet traffic1 of a
     predetermined set of users and are generally oblivious to the actual
     content delivered to the user. Such entities indeed tend to be edge
     ISPs that target only the traffic of their customers.
     In this work we show that the above approach misses a substantial
     portion of the on-path entities that modify traffic on the Internet.
     Using extensive observations over a period of several weeks, we
     analyzed petabits of Internet traffic carrying varied content
     delivered by servers having over 1.5 million distinct IP addresses.
     We newly reveal several network operators that modify traffic not
     limited to a specific set of users. Such network operators alter
     Internet traffic on the basis of its content, primarily by the
     website a user visits. The traffic of every Internet user that
     traverses these network operators is susceptible to alteration."

   [1]www.arxiv.org/pdf/1602.07128v1.pdf
--
RR
"Through counter-intelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troubl
e-makers ... And neutralize them, neutralize them, neutralize them"

References

   1. http://www.arxiv.org/pdf/1602.07128v1.pdf