a few observations related to the video presentation: 1) often hear issues about legitimacy of mass surveillance in relation to 'targeted surveillance' as delineator, whereby legitimate targeting is afforded to actual threats to the state and its required security measures that likely involves way more in the realm of reasoning and undocumented information than people are aware of, to determine whether or not a threat exists and if such measures are necessary in terms of state security. thus, surveilling of individuals who are problematic (either as actual foes - aka terrorists, dangerous criminals, spies - or those wrongly-categorized though falling into this same catch-all category) yet where oversight or high fidelity review may not exist and thus reasoning may be weak for who is targeted along with those who are legitimate threats. meaning: in the talk the group or category of 'Muslims' were mentioned as surveillance targets, though perhaps not all of these, yet in relation to profiling, it would suggest mass surveillance could exist in certain communities moreso than in others. in that the individual scales into a group target, the weighting of probability perhaps moving higher in certain demographic characteristics shared as part of a threat model outline. so too, activists against business interests and so on, depending upon how privatized the surveillance model is, what it is being used for, how it is leveraged for political agendas, etc. and so oftentimes in the mainstream viewpoint it tends to be that the targets that tend towards some fraction of 1% of the population are likely legitimate targets (say, 0.00001%) so that, as an example, a US population of 314 million people has around 3,139 actual threats that would justify surveillance measures in terms of their violent activities that threaten to undermine the state or pursue terrorist actions against the population (unless false flag engineered, etc). and here is my contention with this view, and how a category such as 'ethnicity' or 'religion' may indicate there are other potential dynamics that legitimate mass surveillance, and so it may be a fallacy to uphold this perspective, that only some fraction of 1% are justifiable for targeted surveillance and not dragnets over the entire population-- because, what if instead the threat involves an invading force, an occupation, where the opponent tends towards 30% to more than 50% or more, so that it could be 150 million people and those they are related to that require tracking and further analysis. and that this is the more likely threat model, in certain scenarios, depending on how it is calculated. and could also exist as a paradox, where 'both sides' use the same or similar surveillance to track opponents, though with different ends such that the NSA is not a monolithic ideological organization and could be involved in a deception campaign whereby there is a 'sandbox' for a pretend-NSA operating as if the NSA, inside the larger organization and this is the context for issues of who is surveilled, how surveillance is occurring, state- and world-level honey traps, bear traps, monster traps, and so on. in plain sight i think there are conditions of a civil war at world scale and this is the threat model, and there is rotten surveillance that is driven by the corrupt state, and a surrogate or pretend-NSA at the helm, itself corrupted yet also contained, and then another threat model that is monitoring all of this activity via surveillance at the scale of 50% or greater of the population, in great and intricate detail, that remains legitimate. and so, a vast forward strategy yet that is invisible, and a smaller corrupt forward strategy that will be made visible in its corruption. (set(subset)) dynamics. in that this complex approach maps to military strategy of the early into late 20th century, including the aftermath of WWII and politics of Vietnam war in cultural terms extended into the present, and in terms of {superset}, millennia of strategic planning likewise, setting up a false order in order to take it down in an open-source context of Armageddon. 2) it seems bizarre that NSA activities are confined to computer technology and there is yet no mention of behavioral dimensions to hacking, including neurological attacks using em tools and weaponry. in that psychologists, neurologists, psychiatrists and others vital information to hacking people who are targeted, to program or force into disrepair. for instance, certain chemicals can enter into the body via food supply and then be triggered via signals and electromagnetic fields, activating them via remote switch. chemicals in food supply then like junk dna that allows such custom targeting at a distance, say via hostile management of infrastructure, beyond normal rules, boundaries. the realm of mindwarfare and psychological war, information operations at the covert level _must be tied to this same NSA infrastructure manipulation if existing and attacking populations, yet why is it disregarded as part of this context, why is the very direct connection between EM tech and EM human physiology disregarded a priori as an attack vector and not dealt with in the human rights context it should exist within by default, if made readily aware that such dynamics are inherent- not anomaly - to this aggressive surveillance, goals of behavior modification, etc. 3) this leads to the issue of how this technology is fielded. if it exists, the quickest and most distribributed, efficient route for an eight-mile distant attack would be the cellular tower infrastructure that already exists. that would turn it from a manual operation with field agents on site or locally, to an issue of remote administration of these tools and their automation, such that any person (tending towards 50% of population model, say) could be attacked, and that it is not a tiny fraction and instead every single device that could be scaled to the highest threat model as need be, and thus whatever tools exist to do this would need to exist in a context of mass surveillance, not individual cases that are few and far between, because if that is not the nature of the actual threat, why would tools be restricted in their use to a less-than-necessary deployment. and thus automated infrastructure deployment seems probable in this regard. 4) in this way, so too, neurological weaponry and behavior modification hacking tools would likely coexist in a similar context if deployed and in use, much more serious than attacking inert tools and equipment. attacking peoples - citizens - nervous systems and minds, driving people into ill health or conditions of psychological/physiological torture via these same technical means, perhaps a sub-branch of NSA or co-use via CIA special programs or other military venture, yet hostile to citizenry, operating in a faulty or infallible threat model, exploited by onesided politics of hidden dictatorship and so on. that level of realism does not yet exist though certainly some measure of these hostile tools exist hidden within the same infrastructure - deployed and leveraged by the corrupt overseers, so when will Snowden or other documents enter into the neurological and other health aspects of hacking, cracking, pwnage, etc. that is, invisible death squads sitting like chess pieces on the city grid, awaiting orders to attack via next hostile moves, &c. ksais ywios wpswz