Anti War: Thread

[grarpamp]

Not only is nuclear war unwinnable,
and complete assured destruction and ruin of the world,
nukes remove the feedback of slow physical war from,
and remove all civilian control from,
the psychopaths and psychotics in power around the world,
it's literally a big red fun button for them to mash
at your expense.


The U.N. Nuclear Ban Treaty Has No Clothes

Authored by Gregory F. Giles via RealClear Wire,

Fear sells—the more existential the better, as with all the loose talk
about the possible use of nuclear weapons by Vladimir Putin. While
nuclear dread is good for “driving clicks,” it must not blind us to
reality. The U.N. nuclear ban treaty will do nothing to reduce such
nuclear dangers. How could it? None of the countries possessing
nuclear weapons will have anything to do with it. Not unlike “The
Emperor’s New Clothes,” proponents of the Treaty on Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) want us to believe in its magnificence, to go
along with the pretense while it is plain to see that the treaty is
stripped of any credibility.

The second gathering of signatories late last year revealed a host of
treaty flaws. Any hope that member states and civil society would
staunchly self-police the treaty were dashed. They all turned a blind
eye to the involvement of Kazakhstan, a treaty member, in the testing
of a Russian ICBM—a missile whose sole purpose is to deliver nuclear
weapons.

When the test occurred in April last year, the International Campaign
to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) trumpeted that under the TPNW, it
was “illegal” for Kazakhstan “to allow its territory to be used for
testing of nuclear-capable missiles.”[i] Yet, ICAN and TPNW member
states, including Kazakhstan, were silent about the ICBM test—at a
meeting whose purpose is to assess the implementation of the ban
treaty.

Evidently, because Kazakhstan is struggling with the legacy of Soviet
nuclear tests on its territory and will host next year’s treaty
review, it was given a “pass.” So much for the assertions of TPNW
advocates that the treaty is non-discriminatory, a contrast they like
to draw with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which
recognized in 1968 the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Russia, and China as nuclear weapon states—and everyone else as
non-nuclear weapon states.

Once again, TPNW member states failed to call out Russia by name for
its irresponsible nuclear behavior, this time including de-ratifying
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and moving to deploy
tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Why? Because the diplomatic corps
of the non-nuclear weapon states consider it impolite to call out bad
actors by name.

How can a treaty that won’t call out malign behavior of even
non-member states like Russia— or hold accountable one of its actual
signatories like Kazakhstan—be expected to resolve disputes in the
event the major powers somehow join its ranks and warily give up their
nuclear bombs. The answer is plain, it cannot, which is why those
powers boycott it.

They are not alone. NATO member states and U.S. allies in Asia also
refuse to join the TPNW. Others have read the writing on the wall.
Finland and Sweden, which attended the first meeting of TPNW states
parties as observers in 2022, balked last year, preferring to join
NATO rather than place their faith in the ban treaty. Other states
that observed the first gathering but punted this time include the
Netherlands, Burundi, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. You
wouldn’t know that, though, by reading any of the self-congratulatory
statements issued after the meeting by TPNW member states and civil
society.

It is a tough time for TPNW supporters. The initial euphoria of
circumventing the major powers and rushing the treaty through is over.
Now comes the more mundane work of implementing it, structurally weak
as it is. That’s not helpful for ICAN and others who need to keep
members motivated and attract donors. That’s become harder now that
the MacArthur Foundation has pulled out of the nuclear disarmament
field, seeing poor prospects ahead. Austria has a solution for that,
however.

In a weak decision document, Austria has convinced TPNW member states
that what they really need is better talking points about the
so-called evils of nuclear deterrence. This is a hobby horse of a few
individuals in the Austrian foreign ministry, somehow convinced that
they can simply debate Western countries into surrendering their
nuclear protection, even as their counterparts in the Austrian
ministry of defense seek closer ties with NATO. This new initiative
will fail—states under the nuclear umbrella are not under any
obligation to engage in such theater.

The reality is, since the brutal 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and
the rapid build-up of nuclear arms by such stalwarts of international
law and human rights as China and North Korea, free people everywhere
are rediscovering the value of nuclear deterrence over one-sided
nuclear disarmament. There is a reason why ICAN has not published any
polls since 2022 purporting to show vast public support for the TPNW
and opposition to U.S. nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe.

Surely, the TPNW must be good for something? The ban treaty is slowly
carving out an important niche in assisting victims and remediating
environments impacted by nuclear weapons use or testing. It also is
promoting new standards of inclusivity and gender balance. But it has
been divisive, too. Its insistence on nuclear disarmament irrespective
of the security environment lacks realism and only deepens the chasm
between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.

Let’s face it, progress on nuclear disarmament won’t be coming anytime
soon. TPNW supporters can lament this and withhold cooperation from
the nuclear weapons states, or they can apply their energy in a more
promising area—non-proliferation. Surely, keeping nuclear weapons from
spreading is just as important as easing the grip of those who already
possess them. Making progress on the former should not be held hostage
to progress on the latter—that would be a wasted opportunity indeed.

Gregory F. Giles is a Senior Director with Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC). For the past three decades, he has
been advising U.S. government clients on issues related to deterrence
and nonproliferation. Mr. Giles holds a B.A. from Dickinson College
and an M.I.A. from Columbia University. His work has been published in
War on the Rocks, Survival, Comparative Strategy, The Washington
Quarterly, and elsewhere. The views expressed in this article
represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the
views of SAIC, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government.